Hobbes

Given the casualty figures in the war to date, wherein the highest recorded casualties from an attack is 53, it is almost certain this condition will not trigger. Russia is running out of the munitions it needs to stage these kinds of attacks and while it is clearly willing to strike Ukrainian cities for moral purposes, it will not be doing so with a magnitude greater than the early strikes of 2022 which failed to trigger the condition.

Recent events have signalled to nations which have the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons that they should do so. The failure of the JCPOA and increasing emergency of a Russia-Chian revisionist axis creates the space to pursue national interests and avoid ignore international legal barriers. With the world's focus on Ukraine and Gaza it seems highly unlikely there will be enough diplomatic pressure on Iran to conform to JCPOA requirements such as inspections.

Doing so will require the cooperation of Hezbollah and the current conflict with Israel means they are far too distracted to do the kind of political trading which is required. [1]

[1] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240305-what-is-lebanons-priority-electing-a-president-or-resisting-israel/

Of these, Georgia is the most likely.

1) South Ossetia and Abkhazia are in a somewhat similar state to the Donbass prior to the current conflict in that they are defacto occupied by Russia and it wouldn't be difficult to justify a 'protective' invasion and annexation if the Kremlin regime felt it was something they required. However as long as they have a friendly (controlled) government in Tbilisi there is little need for any of this. So this condition would only be likely to trigger if the Georgian government were to fall in response to recent protests _and_ Russia felt the need for another conflict. As it has its hands full at the moment, the odds are correspondingly low.

Moldova - Very confused by this as obviously Russia currently has forces within Transnistria. If I understand the triggering conditions correctly however, this would trigger if they send additional forces there fore some reason, which they might well do if they see a benefit in opening another front (presumably flying or parachuting them in). The odds seem fairly low however, as it would be seen as a colossal escalation, and would not be consistent with their current defensive/attritional tactics.

Kazakhstan - Difficult to see how they would benefit from doing this. Perhaps if the government were to fall, they might invade to prop it up after the fashion of Afghanistan in the 70s/80s. Would that trigger the condition.

Armenia - Armenia is definitely moving in a 'western direction' since the recent conflict with Azerbaijan, however a Russian intervention here would be far harder to justify than in the case of Georgia. There would seem not a lot to be gained for the Russians here.

Confirmed previous forecast

Confirmed previous forecast

Confirmed previous forecast

Confirmed previous forecast